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Abstract 
Project appraisal plays an important role in choosing the right project and is crucial for 
the success of public investment projects. Different factors may affect the choice of ap-
praisal process in different countries. By use of simple game-theoretical models, the 
article aims to answer two questions: Why do countries adopt different public investment 
appraisal processes, such as top-down versus bottom-up processes? Why do different 
countries share similar features, such as external review, in the public investment apprais-
al process? Two selected countries, China and Norway, are used as case studies. The 
results illustrate that a country’s political system and social norms play important roles in 
determining the selection of a project appraisal process. However, external review 
schemes such as external evaluation by consulting companies and experts can be optimal 
in both top-down and bottom-up project appraisal processes. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Why do countries adopt different appraisal processes for public investment, such 
as top-down processes versus bottom-up processes? Why do appraisal processes 
share similar features, such as external review, in different countries? The pur-
pose of this article is to answer the above questions by use of simple game-
theoretical models, comparing China and Norway as case studies. The results 
illustrate that a country’s political system and social norms play important roles 
in determining the selection of a project appraisal process. However, external 
review schemes such as external evaluation by consulting companies and experts 
can be optimal in both top-down and bottom-up project appraisal processes. 
Project appraisal plays an important role in choosing the right project and is 
crucial to the final success of public investment projects (e.g. Miller and Lessard, 
2000; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Many countries have introduced project govern-
ance schemes applying to important large scale investment projects at either the 
national level or sectoral level. Feasibility studies and impact assessments such 
as cost-benefit analysis, environmental analysis, and financial sustainability 
analysis are either recommended or required by the authorities before a project is 
undertaken. Stakeholder involvement may be also required during planning 
processes. Requirements and practices of project appraisal vary significantly 
from country to country (Dabla-Norris et al., 2011; Klakegg et al., 2009; Laursen 
and Myers, 2009). The appraisal and decision process may be affected by broad 
characteristics of governance in the public sector, such as managerial culture, by 
budgeting processes, and by historical, geographic and demographic factors 
(Christensen et al., 2008; Dixit, 1998; Laursen and Myers, 2009).  
 
*Wenting Chen, PhD in economics, Researcher at the Department of Civil Engineering and Transportation, 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology and Norwegian Institute for Water 
Gro Holst Volden, Research Director, Concept Research Program, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.  
 
 
 
 
Wenting Chen 
Department of Civil Engi-
neering and Transportation, 
Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology and 
Norwegian Institute for Water 
Research  
wentingc@gmail.com 
 
Gro Holst Volden 
Concept Research Program, 
Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology 
gro.holst.volden@ntnu.no 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: external review, 
game theory, project apprais-
al process, top-down process, 
bottom-up process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scandinavian Journal of 
Public Administration 
17(3):65-83 
Wenting Chen, Gro Holst 
Volden and the School of 
Public Administration, 2013 
ISSN:  2001-7405 
E-ISSN: 2001-7413 
 
  
Wenting Chen and Gro Holst Volden 
 
 
 
 
66 
Only a few studies have compared project appraisal processes between 
countries. Laursen and Myers (2009) have compared planning and implementa-
tion processes of four new EU member states (Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia) with three more developed EU member states (Spain, Ireland, and the 
UK) in transport infrastructure investments. The processes are found to be af-
fected by broader issues of governance of public sector. In the UK and Ireland, 
public administration has adopted a more managerial culture, whereas many of 
the more recent EU member counties still rely extensively on laws and decrees 
for policy implementation. Klakegg et al. (2009) compare experiences with the 
system adopted by the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) in the UK with 
the pre-project evaluation process in Norway, with a particular focus on external 
reviews for big public investments. The systems are similar in several respects, 
such as the gateway structure and the use of external reviewing, but the OGC 
system had a less powerful position during the study conduct phase and was 
based more on a support strategy than a control strategy. Dabla-Norris et al. 
(2011) is the first study to develop a composite index to capture ex ante and ex 
post dimensions of investment processes. They compare the efficiency of public 
investment management processes for 71 countries, among which 40 were low-
income countries. Middle-income countries were found, on average, to have 
higher overall efficiency in their investment processes than low-income coun-
tries. To our knowledge, no cross-country comparison of public investment ap-
praisal processes has yet answered the questions that are studied in this article. 
The project appraisal processes in China and Norway are very different, for 
example, in terms of project initiation. In Norway, infrastructure investments are 
often initiated and first assessed locally, even though they often end up being 
funded by the state. Municipalities and other regional stakeholders have a strong 
influence on the final decisions, especially in cases concerning land use. By 
contrast, in China, both the state and political leaders have significant influence 
over the initiation of public-funded infrastructure investments. Norway and Chi-
na differ considerably with respect to political system, social norms, economic 
development stage, and economic size. China is one of the largest and fastest 
growing emerging economies, with tremendous investments in infrastructure 
annually. Norway is among the world’s richest countries, yet it is relatively 
small in terms of its economic size. Whereas China has a centralized political 
system, Norway has a parliamentary democracy governing policymaking. How-
ever, both Norway and China share some common characteristics in their choice 
of project governance schemes, such as the use of consultancy and experts for 
quality assurance.  
As a conceptual framework, our study uses historical and comparative insti-
tutional analysis (HCIA). The framework is often used to address questions 
regarding the origins, nature, and implications of institutions. The essence of 
HCIA is to examine the factors that determine the relevant “rules of the game,” 
the forces that make the rules self-enforcing and the self-enforcing constraints on 
behavior that emerge within these rules (Greif, 1998). The HCIA approach is 
normally used to study equilibrium in a game-theoretical sense (Greif, 1998). In 
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this article, we use both the HCIA framework and classical game theory to study 
the impact of political systems and social norms on the choice of project apprais-
al process for public investments and the effect of external monitoring schemes 
on the efficiency of project appraisals. The study focuses on projects that are 
partly or fully state-funded. If a project is funded partly by the state, the rest of 
the project funding often comes from sources such as user fees or local budgets. 
China and Norway are selected as cases because of the respective top-down and 
bottom-up project appraisal processes. Information about the two countries’ 
decision and appraisal processes for major public investments has been collected 
through reviewing existing literature (e.g. Chen, 2012 on project appraisal pro-
cesses in China; Christensen, 2011; Klakegg et al, 2009; Samset, et al., 2006; 
Samset and Volden, 2013 on project appraisal processes in Norway), regulations 
on project appraisal processes particularly for China (e.g. NDRC, 2005, 2004; 
National People’s Congress, 2003; CIECC, 2002) and other public documents. 
Information on Norwegian project appraisal process is well documented and 
publicly available, but not in the case of China. Regulation review is thus carried 
out to identify the Chinese project appraisal process. We admit that the current 
study bases solely on literature review, both empirical study and qualitative 
interviews with relevant regional and central governors as well as local stake-
holders are left for future research.   
Section 2, presents the general appraisal process for major public invest-
ments in both Norway and China, as examples of countries with “bottom-up” 
and “top-down” appraisal processes, respectively. Section 3 identifies major 
differences and similarities of project appraisal processes between the two coun-
tries. Section 4 applies the HCIA framework and introduces game-theoretical 
models to explain that the project appraisal process specific to each country is 
the result of adaptation to, for example, the political system and social norms. 
The functions of external review in the two different processes are also demon-
strated. Section 5 concludes.  
 
Project appraisal process in Norway and China 
Both Norway and China have a formal project appraisal process for public in-
vestments. The more serious the consequences of the investment and/or the 
higher the investment cost involved, the more detailed the impact assessments 
should be, as required by regulations in different countries. To make our study 
more manageable, it is limited to major investment projects financed, at least 
partly, by the national authorities in the two study countries. 
Norway is one of the few countries where the Ministry of Finance has intro-
duced a common scheme for all major public investments, including two exter-
nal reviews in the planning process for investment projects. The scheme applies 
to public investments with expected value larger than NOK 750 million (approx-
imately USD 129 million).1 In China, the threshold for qualifying as a major 
public investment depends on whether the central state or the local government 
redeems the bonds, if sovereign bonds are used to finance the project. The 
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threshold is CNY 5 billion (approximately USD 818 million) if the state redeems 
sovereign bonds. The threshold is CNY 50 billion (approximately USD 8 billion) 
if local governments redeem the sovereign bonds (National Development and 
Reform Committee (NDRC, 2004).   
 
Major public investments in Norway 
The appraisal and decision process for major public investments in Norway 
covers three phases: project initiation, pre-study, and pre-project, before the final 
approval.  
A project idea may be initiated from different sources, such as stakeholder 
groups, local authorities, politicians, or state agencies. Very often, the idea 
comes “from below” and is initiated by those who will benefit from the project. 
Based on a project idea, the responsible agency will perform an internal feasibil-
ity analysis of the project (pre-study), and then engage in a more detailed plan-
ning process (pre-project). In Norway, the Norwegian Public Roads Administra-
tion is an example of an agency responsible for public road projects. 
Obligatory external review is required for public investments exceeding 
NOK 750 million. The system is named the Quality Assurance (QA) scheme, 
and it has two decision gates at the front-end. QA1 is a review of the internal 
feasibility analysis, and is performed at the end of the pre-study, before the 
choice of concept is made by the Cabinet. The consultant reviews the project’s 
feasibility, impacts, and conformity with societal needs (Samset et al., 2006).2  
Both the internal feasibility study and QA1 should follow national guidelines for 
assessing different impacts, such as land use, costs and benefits of the invest-
ment, and environmental and social consequences. The appendix 1 provides a 
list of regulations that are relevant to public investment appraisal.   
If the decision is “go” after QA1, the next stage is a pre-project, where a de-
tailed cost estimate and a management base are developed for the project execu-
tion. Stakeholder hearings are also important at this stage. After the pre-project, 
external reviewers go through this documentation and give their recommenda-
tion (QA2) before the final approval is made by Parliament (Samset et al., 2006). 
The Ministry of Finance has a framework agreement with several independ-
ent consulting companies that perform QA. The sectoral ministries, in collabora-
tion with the Ministry of Finance, decide when a QA will start.   
The project planning process in Norway was traditionally and is still highly 
democratic, with extensive involvement by local authorities and stakeholders. 
The QA system anchors the most fundamental decisions in the Cabinet, but the 
system is designed to be independent of any particular government. The QA 
regime introduced by the Ministry of Finance, however, tends to increase the 
state’s control over fundamental decision-making on major public investments.  
Another important purpose of the QA is to increase the professional quality 
of the evaluation that endorses a project. Because cost overruns for public in-
vestments were a serious problem in Norway before 2000, QA2 was introduced 
to strengthen cost control (Samset et al., 2006; Samset and Volden, 2013).  As 
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local stakeholders are often better informed than the national government, intro-
duction of an external review is expected to reduce local incentives to overesti-
mate benefits and underestimate costs during public project appraisal (Samset 
and Volden, 2013).  
 
 
Major public investments in China 
State and political leaders play important roles in project initiation in China. The 
state is responsible for making a blueprint that states what kind of investment 
projects should be initiated. Regional governments then propose projects under 
the state’s guidance. In some cases, political leaders play a decisive role in initi-
ating megaprojects.  
Project appraisal differs according to the scale of projects and funding 
sources. Requirements for major public investment fall into corresponding cate-
gories. All public projects with government funding in the form of direct gov-
ernment investment and capital injection need approval for project documents, 
including project appraisal, feasibility study, and project design. The three minis-
tries, the National Development and Reform Committee, the Ministry of Envi-
ronmental Protection (MEP), and the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), 
are responsible for approval of the documents. If projects have subsidies greater 
than CNY 2 billion (USD 327 million), or obtain a state investment subsidy 
between CNY 30 million and CNY 2 billion (USD 4.91–327 million) with the 
state subsidy share exceeding 50% of the total investment, they will be regarded 
as funded by direct capital injection from the state budget and will need approval 
from the three Ministries (NDRC, 2005). Each of the three ministries has a dif-
ferent focus and has the right to veto a project proposal. The MEP focuses on 
both environmental design and environmental impact assessments The MLR 
takes responsibility for monitoring changes to land use. The NDRC is responsi-
ble for all the other aspects of project evaluation, such as cost-benefit analysis 
and socio-economic impacts. Before the three ministries’ approval, external 
review is required. There are 46 consulting companies authorized by the NDRC 
to conduct external evaluation of project documents submitted to the NDRC. 
Experts drawn from a database of experts are also involved in such external 
evaluations. The experts usually are researchers at the universities and research 
institutes, with a high level of education in the relevant field and a minimum of 
eight years relevant work experience. If all three ministries approve a project 
proposal, it will be forwarded to the State Council for final approval3 (Chen, 
2012; Ministry of Finance and National Audit Office, 2003;  CIECC, 2002).   
Recently, increased emphasis has been placed on environmental concerns 
and public involvement in China. The Chinese Environmental Impact Assess-
ment Law (EIA) issued on 1 September 2003 requires comprehensive environ-
mental reviews in the planning stages of major public and private development 
projects. The EIA law formally requires public involvement in major invest-
ments. However, to our knowledge, public involvement in earlier stages of pro-
ject appraisal is still limited. Some municipalities, such as Shanghai, have tried 
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to establish institutions to facilitate public involvement in project appraisal pro-
cesses (Chen, 2012).  
 
Political systems, social norms, and external review 
One of the major differences between Norway and China, in the project appraisal 
process, is the relationship between the state and regional government and the 
role of national political leaders in the initiation of the public investments. In 
China, the state and political leaders seem to have more control of what kind of 
projects should be proposed, whereas in Norway the state receives and assesses 
proposals from regional governments. Political leaders have played an important 
role in initiating several megaprojects in China, such as the south–north water 
diversion project and the Three Gorges Dam project, although the latter was 
funded by user fees. By contrast, state leaders in Norway in principle play a less 
active role in project initiation. In addition, China still has very limited stake-
holder involvement in the early project appraisal process compared to the Nor-
wegian case. The study therefore concludes that China has a more top-down 
decision and appraisal process than Norway with respect to project initiation and 
appraisal.  
Political systems and social norms are likely to be instrumental in shaping 
diverse institutional arrangements. Given the centralized political system in 
China and the democratic political arrangements in Norway, a top-down project 
appraisal process seems to be a natural practice for China, whereas a bottom-up 
process is more appropriate in Norway. Furthermore, China has a cultural tradi-
tion of deference to authority. Regional governments are less prone to challenge 
the state, and citizens are less prone to challenge the decisions made by bureau-
crats. By contrast, Norwegians have far more individualistic attitudes and are 
more willing to confront opposing ideas and policies. A top-down project ap-
praisal process in China normally has very few opponents from the regional 
level, unless stakeholders’ interests are devastatingly affected by a project. In 
Norway, adopting such a system could easily give rise to opposition and result in 
huge negotiation costs, for example in the case of disputes between the regional 
authorities and the state. 
Despite the different approach during project initiation and involvement of 
regional governments and stakeholders in China and Norway, both countries 
resort to external review to evaluate projects and to provide solid support for 
decision making. In Norway, one reason for adopting the QA system was that 
local governments were strategically overestimating project benefits and under-
estimating costs in order to convince the state to approve the public investment 
(Samset and Volden, 2013). Samset and Volden (2013) found that, 13 years after 
the establishment of the QA system, the percentage of projects with a completed 
project cost within the agreed cost framework has increased from below 40% to 
about 80%. The strategic behavior that was observed in Norway is less likely 
under a top-down project appraisal process,4 but external review is still useful. 
Under a top-down appraisal process, external review may well carry out a peer 
review function and provide a double check for the first round evaluation. 
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The following section applies game-theoretical models to explain how the 
political system and social norms affect project appraisal processes, thus leading 
to divergent processes in Norway and China. Game-theoretical models are also 
provided to explain the effectiveness of the external review in the two different 
types of project appraisal processes.  
 
Game-theoretical models 
This section applies two game-theoretical models to explain how the political 
system and social norms affect the formation of a project appraisal process and 
lead to divergent processes in Norway (bottom-up) and China (top-down) (sec-
tion 4.1). Two further models are constructed to explain why external consult-
ants and experts are important for the selection of good projects under both bot-
tom-up and top-down project appraisal processes (sections 4.2 and 4.3). 
 
The choice of project appraisal process 
Model specifications 
Here, we introduce a two-stage game-theoretical model. Two players are as-
sumed in the model: the state, which makes its decision on behalf of the whole 
country; and the regional government, which represents the interests of local 
people. In the first stage, the state implements a project appraisal process, choos-
ing between a top-down project appraisal process and a bottom-up project ap-
praisal process. In the second stage, the regional government chooses to obey the 
new process or to oppose it. The process will be fully implemented only if the 
regional government obeys it. If the regional government opposes the process, 
the state will not be able to carry out the process fully and hence not be able to 
obtain the benefit from the process.  
Both bottom-up and top-down project appraisal processes bear administra-
tive costs. 0>iE denotes the gain the state obtains after establishing a new pro-
ject appraisal process under political system i by improving the efficiency of 
project appraisal, where i =D,C . D stands for a democratic political system and 
C stands for a centralized political system. ijA denotes the administrative cost 
under political system i , where j = t,b. t stands for a top-down project appraisal 
process and b stands for a bottom-up project appraisal process. The administra-
tive cost is assumed to be higher if the project appraisal process has a different 
structure (top-down versus bottom-up) from the political system than if the two 
share the same structure. When the two systems share the same structure, bu-
reaucratic institutions could be shared and the cost be reduced. This implies 
D
b
D
t AA > and 
C
t
C
b AA > . The benefit for the regional government under a politi-
cal system i is ijB  if the regional government obeys the project appraisal pro-
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cess, j. Here, we assume that the regional government always prefers a bottom-
up project appraisal process as it will take into account the interests of different 
stakeholders regardless of the political system. A top-down project appraisal 
process may also contradict social norms if individualism is a fundamental value 
for the majority of people and thus reduce the welfare of local people. Therefore,
0>ibB and 0<itB . If the regional government opposes the proposal from the 
state, the benefit for the state is simplified as zero and it only bears the adminis-
trative cost5. The regional government’s benefit also will be zero if it opposes 
the proposal under a democratic political system, while the regional government 
bears a cost, 0>CC , if it opposes the proposal under a centralized political 
system. The cost could come from different sources. In the case of China, pro-
motion of leaders in the regional government is decided by the central govern-
ment and there is competition for promotion between the leaders in the regional 
governments (Zhou, 2010). Openly confronting a decision from the central gov-
ernment means risking the loss of promotion opportunities or political rents. 
Here we assume that the political rent is much higher than the absolute loss in-
curred by the region, that is Ct
C BC >  or Ct
C BC −<− . 
Figures 1 and 2 show the decision trees for the state (S) and regional gov-
ernment (R) with Figure 1 for a democratic political system, and Figure 2 for a 
centralized political system.  
 
Figure 1: The decision trees for state (S) and regional government (R) when 
forming a project appraisal process under a democratic political system (the 
payoffs are shown in parentheses: the first player’s payoff on the left and the 
second player’s payoff on the right).  
 
 
S 
R 
R Top-down 
Bottom-up 
Obey 
Oppose 
Obey 
Oppose 
( , ) 
( , ) 
( , ) 
( , ) 
1st stage 2nd stage 
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Figure 2: The decision trees for state (S) and regional government (R) when 
forming a project appraisal process under a centralized political system (the 
payoffs are shown in parentheses: the first player’s payoff on the left and the 
second player’s payoff on the right). 
 
 
 
Backward induction 
Backward induction is used to determine the optimal strategy for both the state 
and the regional government.  
 
Democratic system 
The decision process under a democratic system is analyzed in Figure 1:  
Stage 2: If the state proposes a top-down project appraisal process, the re-
gional government obtains net benefit DtB if it obeys the process and 0 if it op-
poses the process. Because 0<DtB , the regional government is better off oppos-
ing the proposal than obeying it. By contrast, if the state proposes a bottom-up 
project appraisal process, the regional government obtains net benefit DtB if it 
obeys the process, whereas DtB  is higher than 0 if it opposes the process. The 
regional government will then be better off accepting the process.  
Stage 1: Given that the regional government will oppose a top-down process 
if the state proposes it, the state will bear the administrative cost, 0<− DtA . 
Given that the regional government will obey a bottom-up process if the state 
proposes it, the state obtains net benefit 0>− Db
D AE . Because 
S 
R 
R Top-down 
Bottom-up 
Obey 
Oppose 
Obey 
Oppose 
( , ) 
( , ) 
( , ) 
( , ) 
1st stage 2nd stage 
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D
t
D
b
D AAE −>− , the optimal strategy for the state is to propose a bottom-up 
project appraisal process. The strategy (Bottom-up, Obey) is the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium6 of the game.  
 
Centralized system 
Figure 2 shows a decision tree for the state (S) and the regional government (R) 
when forming a project appraisal process under a centralized political system. At 
stage 2, the regional government always gains more by accepting the proposal 
from the State, no matter the type of proposal. If the state proposes a top-down 
process, the regional government loses by obeying, and the loss from sacrificing 
the interests of some stakeholders is less than the loss of political rents i.e., 
C
t
C BC −<− . If the state proposes a top-down project appraisal process, obey-
ing will be a better choice for the regional government as CCb CB −>> 0  . At 
stage 1, given that the regional government always will obey, the state will pro-
pose a top-down process because the administrative cost is lower with a top-
down process, hence the state incurs a net benefit, that is, Cb
CC
t
C AEAE −>− . 
Henceforth, the strategy (Top-down, Obey) is the subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium of the game.  
Proposition 1: Under a democratic political system, the optimal strategy is 
(Bottom-up, Obey), i.e., the state proposes a bottom-up project appraisal process 
and the regional government chooses to obey the process. Under a centralized 
political system, the optimal strategy is (Top-down, Obey), i.e., the state propos-
es a top-down project appraisal process and the regional government chooses to 
obey the process. Both optimal strategies are subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium.  
 
External review under a bottom-up project appraisal process  
Benchmark: without external review  
We first look at the importance of external review in a bottom-up project ap-
praisal process. Once the appraisal process is passed at the national level, the 
regional government proposes a project. In the first stage, the regional govern-
ment needs to submit a project proposal to the state, including a social cost and 
benefit analysis. The regional government is assumed to have more information 
about the net benefit of the proposed project, that is, the project net benefit is 
unobservable to the state and only known by the region. Hence, the regional 
government could choose to reveal the true net benefit of the project or to over-
state it. The regional government will reveal the project’s true net benefit only if 
the project is a “good” project. In this case, the project has large positive effects 
nationwide, even if it brings relatively low regional benefits. However, the re-
Top-down versus bottom-up project appraisal processes, and external review 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
gional government will overestimate the net benefit of the proposal only if the 
project is a “bad” project. The “bad” project is defined as a project with low 
positive impact nationwide but relatively high regional effects. The true cost 
could be revealed by external review. In the second stage, the state either ap-
proves the project or disapproves it after reviewing the proposal. Figure 3 shows 
the decision trees for both the state (S) and the regional government (R) without 
external monitoring and under a democratic political system.  
 
Figure 3: The decision trees for state (S) and regional government (R) without 
external review under a democratic political system (the payoffs are shown in 
parentheses: the first player’s payoff on the left and the second player’s payoff 
on the right; and the dashed represents one information set for the two strategies 
of regional government) 
 
 
The payoffs depend on how the regional government reports the net benefit 
of the project and whether the state will approve the project or not. The state 
only knows that, with probability p, the regional government will reveal the true 
net benefit of a “good” project, and with probability 1-p, the regional govern-
ment will overestimate the net benefit of a “bad” project. The state will obtain a 
net present value at national level, TE , if the regional government truly reveals a 
project’s net benefit when the project is “good.” The state will gain OE  if the 
regional government overestimates a “bad” project’s net profit. If the state re-
jects the project proposed and invest the budget in the other area instead, it will 
gain E . We assume that 0>>> OT EEE . The regional net benefit for carrying 
out a “good” project is TB  and for a “bad” project is OB . OT BB <<0 . Stand-
R 
S 
S 
Truth 
Overestimate 
Approve 
Reject 
Approve 
Reject 
( , ) 
( ,  ) 
( , ) 
(  ,  ) 
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(1-p) 
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ard backward induction is adopted to solve the two-stage game under a top-down 
political system without external review. 
Stage 2: Given a project appraisal process, when the regional government 
proposes a project to the state, it could choose to reveal the true net profit if the 
project is a “good” project or overestimate the net benefit if the project is “bad.” 
The state chooses whether to approve the proposal. As the state only knows the 
probability of the regional government’s choices, the expected benefit for the 
state reads OT EppE )1(Prove)(EBstate −+=   if it approves the project. The 
expected benefit for the state will equal E=(Reject)EBstate  if it rejects the pro-
ject proposal and invests the same amount of the budget somewhere else. As 
long as ( ) ( ) 1/ ≤≤−− pEEEE OTO , (Reject)EBProve)(EB statestate > . The opti-
mal strategy for the state will always be to approve the project if the state believes 
the probability that the regional government will tell the truth is high. If 
( ) ( )OTO EEEEp −−<≤ /0 , the state will reject the proposal.  
Stage 1: Given that the state will approve the project where
( ) ( ) 1/ ≤≤−− pEEEE OTO , the regional government gains TB if it reveals the 
true net benefit of the project and oB  if it overestimates the net benefit. Because 
oT BB < , the optimal strategy for the regional government is to overestimate the 
project net benefit, that is, 0=p . However, the regional government’s choice is 
not consistent with the state’s belief and choice in Stage 1 with 
( ) ( ) 1/ ≤≤−− pEEEE OTO . Hence, the optimal strategy (Overestimate, Ap-
prove) is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  
With ( ) ( )OTO EEEEp −−<≤ /0 , the regional government will be no dif-
ferent in choosing (Truth) and (Overestimate). Both strategies (Truth, Reject) 
and (Overestimate, Reject) are the optimal strategy. However, only the strategy 
(Overestimate) by the regional government is consistent with the belief of the 
State in stage 1 with ( ) ( )OTO EEEEp −−<≤ /0 . Hence, only one strategy 
(Overestimate, Reject) is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  
Proposition 2: Without an external review, the regional government will 
tend to propose projects with low national value and to overestimate the net 
benefit of a given project. The state will reject the project when it is proposed. 
The strategy (Overestimate, Reject) is the only subgame perfect Nash equilibri-
um for the game. Therefore, with asymmetric information and diverting interests 
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between state and region, few projects will be approved and funded by the state, 
which is not a good solution for society.  
 
With an external review 
Figure 4 shows the decision tree when there is an external review scheme under 
a democratic political system. With an external review scheme, there is no in-
formation asymmetry concerning the project net benefit between the regional 
government and the state. The decision tree is similar to that in Figure 3. The 
two strategies of the regional government, (Truth) and (Overestimate), provide 
two separate information sets for the state, i.e., the behavior of overestimating 
the project net benefit will be revealed. The state will bear the external monitor-
ing cost, mC , regardless of whether it approves or rejects the project proposal in 
the second stage. In a democratic political system, the state is assumed to obtain 
a net positive benefit if the project is approved and the true cost is low, i.e., 
0>− mT CE . Payoffs for regional government are the same as those described 
in Section 4.2.1. 
 
Figure 4: The decision trees for state (S) and regional government (R) with 
external review under a democratic political system (the payoffs are shown in 
parentheses: the first player’s payoff on the left and the second player’s payoff 
on the right.) 
 
 
 
Stage 2: If the regional government reveals the true cost of a “good” project, 
the state obtains mT CE − by approving the project but gains mCE −  by rejecting 
the proposal. Because mmT CECE −>− , the state will always approve the pro-
ject. If the regional government proposes a “bad” project with large regional 
effect but negative national impact and overestimates the benefit of the project, 
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the state will lose if it approves the project, because mmO CECE −<− . The 
state will therefore reject the project proposal. 
Stage 1: Given the state’s choice in Stage 2, the regional government will 
compare the payoffs, TB , by proposing a “good” project and revealing the true 
net benefit of the project, with payoffs, 0, by proposing a “bad” project and 
overestimating the project net benefit. As 0>TB , the regional government will 
propose a “good” project with large positive impact nationwide and reveal the 
true net benefit of the project. Therefore, the strategy (True, Approve) is optimal 
and is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  
Proposition 3: With an external review scheme, the regional government 
will tend to propose a project with a positive effect at the national level and to 
reveal the true net benefit of the project. The state will approve the project when 
it is proposed. The strategy (True, Approve) is a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. 
Under a bottom-up project appraisal process, our theoretical model proves 
that it is efficient to adopt an external review, for example, hiring external con-
sulting companies to carry out evaluations, like the QA system in Norway.  
Next, we look at the effect of an external review under a top-down project 
appraisal process. 
 
External consults and experts under a top-down project appraisal process  
Benchmark: without external review  
China has a top-down project appraisal process where the state forms a general 
plan for the types of projects needed nationwide. This means that only projects 
with a large national impact will be proposed. External review might still be 
important to ensure that pre-project evaluations are technically adequate, compe-
tently performed, properly documented, and satisfy established quality require-
ments (Dearfield and Flaak, 2000). In the model presented in this section, “Na-
ture” determines the true net benefit of a project, whether high or low. Nature 
means external factors that affect the project costs and benefits, such as geologi-
cal and economic factors, that neither the State nor the regional governments can 
manipulate. The regional government is not regarded as a decision maker in the 
model. The regional government and the state are assumed to have the same 
information set about the cost and benefit of the projects. Hence, without exter-
nal review, the government knows that, with probability q, the project net benefit 
will be high, and with probability 1- q the project net benefit will be low. The 
state obtains payoff AEk −  if it approves the project and AE − if it rejects the 
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project. kE  is the net benefit of the project nationwide, where HLk ,= . L 
stands for low net benefit and H stands for high net benefit. E is the net benefit if 
the state invests in another project with the same budget. A is the cost of evaluat-
ing the project. We assume  AEEE LH >>> . 
Figure 5 shows the decision trees for the state without external review under 
a centralized political system. 
The expected payoff for the state following approval of the project is 
))(1()(EB(Prove) AEqAEq LH −−+−= . The expected payoff for the state fol-
lowing rejection equals AE −=EB(Reject) . As long as ( ) ( ) 1/ ≤≤−− qEEEE LHL
, )Reject(EB)EB(Prove ≥ . If ( ) ( )LHL EEEEq −−<≤ /0 , )Reject(EB)EB(Prove <
.  
 Proposition 4: Without external  review, the state will approve the project 
only if it believes there is a high probability of the project having high net bene-
fit, i.e., ( ) ( ) 1/ ≤≤−− qEEEE LHL . Otherwise, it will reject the project.  
 
Figure 5: The decision trees for the state (S) without external review under a 
centralized political system (the payoffs of the state are shown in parenthesis); 
and the dashed represents one information set for the two strategies of regional 
government). 
 
With external review  
After introducing external expertise, the state will obtain more information about 
whether the project net benefit will be H or L. Figure 6 shows the decision tree 
for the state when external expertise is used.  
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Figure 6: The decision trees for the state (S) with external review under a cen-
tralized political system (the payoffs of the state are shown in parentheses). 
 
 
Because AEAEH −>− and AEAEL −<−  when the state can use exter-
nal expertise to correctly identify the net benefit of the project, the state will 
approve the project if it has high net benefit and reject the project if the net bene-
fit is low.  
Proposition 5: With external review, the state will have more information 
with which to evaluate the project’s net benefit. The state will approve the pro-
ject if the project’s net benefit is high and reject the project if the net benefit is 
low. 
In reality, of course, pre-project cost and benefit estimation may not be 
100% correct even with external review. Factors like forecasting errors, uncer-
tainty, cognitive bias of people and cautious attitudes towards risk may persist 
after review (Cantarelli et al., 2010). Therefore, our model is a simplification of 
reality.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Project appraisal plays an important role in choosing the right project and the 
success of public investment projects. Different factors may affect the choice of 
appraisal process in different countries. Only a few studies in the project ap-
praisal literature have compared the project appraisal process between countries. 
The present article aims to answer the following two questions: Why do coun-
tries adopt different public investment appraisal processes, for example a top-
down versus a bottom-up process? Why do different countries share similar 
features of the public investment appraisal process, such as external review? For 
our study, China was chosen as a an example of a country with a top-down pro-
ject appraisal process, whereas Norway was chosen as an example with a bot-
tom-up project appraisal process. 
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By using simple game-theoretical models, we show that the political system 
and the social norms in a country play important roles in determining what pro-
ject appraisal process is selected. In a democratic political system with regional 
governments and other stakeholders accustomed to being heard, and in a society 
advocating individualism, a bottom-up project appraisal process will be pre-
ferred. In a centralized political system and a society with a tradition of not chal-
lenging superiors, a top-down project appraisal process will be chosen.  
An external review mechanism can be optimal in both a top-down project 
appraisal process and a bottom-up project appraisal process. With the bottom-up 
process, such a scheme reduces the incidences of strategic cost underestimation 
from regional actors during project appraisal by reducing information asymmetry 
between the regional government and the state. With a top-down process, it 
brings increased competence into the process and leads to a high-quality project 
appraisal, so that the state can be sure to approve good projects and reject bad 
ones. 
Our findings are consistent with those of Laursen and Myers (2009) and 
Dabla-Norris et al., (2011), who found that appraisal processes, project selection, 
and the extent to which politicians involve the public investment management 
processes vary between individual countries. Similar to the OGC system in the 
UK mentioned by Klakegg et al., (2009), the external review scheme in China 
plays a supportive role in project evaluation. By contrast, external review in 
Norway has a more powerful position in quality control and plays an important 
role in final project selection. Thus, empirical study of our theoretical model 
would be desirable in future research.  
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Notes 
 
1 Exceptions apply to some sectors, such as oil and gas investments, hospitals and airports. 
2 If the problem is low capacity in a road system, the choice of concept could be, for example to build 
a bigger road, to increase the number of buses, or to introduce a tax for using the road. In many 
cases, the conclusion is that there is no need for an expensive infrastructure investment project. 
3 Smaller public investments with government funding in the form of direct government investment 
and capital injection need to be approved only by the regional development commissions, i.e., they 
do not need approval from the State Council. 
4 Regional government leaders do compete with each other by investing more in their own region as 
their promotions are directly correlated with the GDP growth of their region (Li and Zhou, 2005; 
Zhou, 2010). Such competition is different from the strategic overestimation of project benefits at 
pre-project evaluation for state invested projects. And the strategic overestimation of project benefits 
may be a signal for bad performance of regional government leaders and have negative impact on 
their promotions. 
5 The model only focuses on when a new project appraisal process is introduced. No payoffs from the 
current situation are considered. Therefore, payoffs for the regional government when it rejects the 
proposal from the state will be zero. The assumption is made for the sake of simplicity. 
6 A strategy profile is Nash equilibrium if and only if each player’s prescribed strategy is a best 
response to the strategies of the others. (p83, Watson, 2002)   
 
Appendix 1: Norwegian national guidance for different impact 
assessment 
Norwegian national guidance for different impact assessment for both internal 
and external review should follow: 
• Instructions for Official Studies and Reports  
• Assessment of the Consequences of Gender Equality 
(www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/dok/veiledninger_brosjyrer/2001/utred
ning-av-konsekvenser-for-likestilli.html?id=87759) 
• Norwegian guidelines for Cost-benefit Analysis 
(www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/dok/veiledninger_brosjyrer/2001/utred
ning-av-konsekvenser-for-likestilli.html?id=87759). 
• The Planning and Building Act for environmental and social conse-
quences impact assessments  
• The Planning and Building Act of 2008 
(www.regjeringen.no/en/doc/laws/Acts/planning-building-
act.html?id=570450) 
 
